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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we focus on a market which consists of a large number of consumers, who
share identical tastes but have different income levels; a large number of firms using old
technology and a monopoly using high technology. We analyze the market effects of a ban
on the use of low technology and show that it can lead to welfare improvements and it results
in more firms producing high quality products using high technology.
Specifically, we analyze the worldwide organic food market and propose that banning
old technology (which corresponds to conventional methods used in agriculture, poultry and
livestock) can be applied to this market as a viable policy considering its supply and demand
properties. Broadening the perspective, we propose that in appropriate markets, banning old
technology can lead to welfare improvements and should be considered as a policy option.
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ESKI˙ TEKNOLOJI˙LERI˙ YASAKLAMAK : ORGANI˙K YI˙YECEK PI˙YASASI O¨RNEG˘I˙
Seher Merve Akbas¸
Ekonomi, MA Tezi, 2009
Yar. Doc¸. Dr. Toker Dog˘anog˘lu
Anahtar Kelimeler: Teknoloji, Endu¨striyel Politika
O¨ZET
Bu tez talep kısmı aynı beg˘eniye fakat farklı gelir seviyelerine sahip c¸ok sayıda tu¨keticiden,
arz ksmı rekabetc¸i olarak homojen bir u¨ru¨n u¨reten c¸ok sayıda firma ile aynı u¨ru¨nu¨ yeni bir
teknoloji kullanarak daha yu¨ksek kalitede u¨reten bir kartelden olus¸an bir piyasayı incele-
mekte. Ayrıca, du¨s¸u¨k teknoloji kullanımının yasaklanmasının piyasaya olan etkilerini analiz
etmekte ve bo¨yle bir mu¨dahalenin daha fazla firmanın yu¨ksek teknoloji kullanarak yu¨ksek
kalite u¨ru¨nler u¨retip refah artıs¸ına yol ac¸abildig˘ini go¨stermekte.
Spesifik olarak du¨nya organik yiyecek piyasası ele alınmakta ve bu piyasanın arz talep
o¨zellikleri yu¨zu¨nden o¨nerdig˘imiz politikalara uygun oldug˘u savunulmakta. Bakıs¸ ac¸ısı
genis¸letilerek, arz ve talep yapısının uygun oldug˘u piyasalarda yu¨ksek teknolojiyi tes¸vik
amacıyla du¨s¸u¨k teknolojinin yasaklanmasının etkili bir politika olabileceg˘i savunulmakta.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The importance of technology in human life is enormous since the beginning of the 20th
century. Upgrading to new technology enables the production of higher quality products and
makes our life easier. However, adopting new technology is costly for firms as it requires the
employment of qualified labor and investment in infrastructure. Very frequently we witness
the introduction of all-new technology to be used in the production process of any product,
but it takes time for firms to adapt this new technology. Usually, high quality products based
on new technology exist in the market along with lower quality products. If new technology
is adapted by very few firms, these firms gain market power and become able to set the price
for their high quality products. In this way they can enjoy positive profits.
If a new technology is adapted by very few firms which enjoy market power and if
the low technology is well established so that it has a competitive market there is a price
difference between the high quality product and the low quality product in equilibrium, which
is called price premium. This price premium depends on the number of firms using high
technology and low technology, on firms’ cost function, as well as on the consumer demand
for both quality levels.
If the variable cost of producing high quality product is not very different than that of
low quality product and at the same time if consumers value high quality product a lot, then
a market intervention to spread the use of high technology and allow the consumers enjoy
higher surplus might increase total welfare of the society, which we take as the sum of the
consumer surplus and the producer surplus.
In this paper, we are trying to show with a basic model that in appropriate markets,
banning the use of old technology might be a viable market intervention so that it increases
total welfare and does not lead to serious harm to society.
A recent example for this policy was employed in European egg market. With a direc-
tive in 1999, European Council has banned the use of conventional egg production methods
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starting from January, 2012. In this paper we analyze the worldwide organic food market
and propose that banning old technology (which corresponds to conventional methods used
in agriculture, poultry and livestock) can be applied as a viable policy considering the supply
and demand side properties of the market. Broadening the perspective we propose that in
appropriate markets, banning old technology can lead to welfare improvements and should
be considered as a policy option.
Before analyzing market properties, we will explain the history of “organic method”.
“Organic” is a labeling claim that describes how an agricultural food or fiber product was
grown and handled before it reached the consumer. Pesticides, fertilizers, antibiotics, syn-
thetic hormones, genetic engineering are inconsistent with organic production.Until early
20th century main aim of agriculture was to increase productivity through the use of various
kinds of synthetic products such as pesticides and fertilizers. It was early 1900s when Rudolf
Steiner’s Spiritual Foundations for the Renewal of Agriculture has inspired the so called bio-
dynamic agriculture in Germany, which shares the same principles with organic farming. Sir
Albert Howard, who is seen as the father of organic movement has published his “Agricul-
tural Testament” in 1940 where he has explored composting as an alternative to fertilizers.
However it was late 1960s when consumer awareness of environmental issues grew up and
organic farming techniques spread all over the world including not only European countries
but also the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan. From 1990 on governments adopted
legal frameworks in order to monitor the organic food market and to bring standards to the
term “organic” as throughout its development consumers were confused about what exactly
organic food means. European Union adopted its first regulation on June 24, 1991 with
Council Regulation (EEC)No: 2092/91 which was implemented in 1992. It laid down basic
rules for organic farming and led to its official recognition. Since then this regulation is up-
dated or supplemented with new regulations. With the Council Regulation (EC) 834/2007 of
28 June 2007, which establishes a general framework to rules regarding plant, livestock and
aquaculture production including rules on conversion, production of wine, feed and organic
yeast,
• the use of EU organic logo will be mandatory
• the place where the products are farmed will be indicated
• to be able to carry an organic logo, at least 95 percent of the ingredients should be
organic
• and genetically modified organisms (GMO) will be prohibited.
United States followed an almost simultaneous path with Europe. In 1990 Organic
Foods Production Act proposed national standards for production, labeling and selling of “or-
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ganic” labeled foods. After requested public comment and revisions held by United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), on October 21, 2002 National Organic Standards be-
came effective as a federal law. National Organic Program (NOP) is the legal body which
manages organic standards and certification of organic products. According to the law, prod-
ucts that make organic claims must be certified by a USDA-accredited organization. How-
ever, farms selling less than $5,000 per year are exempt from accreditation. As in EU, certi-
fied products contain a minimum of 95% organic ingredients. Most synthetic herbicides and
pesticides as well as genetically modified seed are prohibited too. All organic livestock must
be fed by organic feed and they may not be given growth hormones. The use of antibiotics
and manure are not allowed.
Organic food can be seen as a “new technology which bears a fixed cost” in our frame-
work as it is a new system which not only requires a costly conversion process but also bears
higher variable costs. Specifically, the studies about the cost of organic egg production sys-
tem will be covered in chapter 3. In chapter 2 we will discuss the organic market in Europe
and in the US in detail. Chapter 3 gives information about the ban on conventional egg pro-
duction system in Europe and the cost structure of the new egg production systems. Chapter
4 presents the model and Chapter 5 gives concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
An Overview of the Organic Market
2.1 Introduction
In the last ten years organic food market experienced an enormous growth worldwide. Al-
though it has it’s roots in Europe, more than 120 countries practice organic farming today.
According to a survey conducted by Research Institute for Organic Farming (FIBL)
[Willer and Yussefi, 2007] total area operated organically was almost 31 million hectares in
2007. The number of total organic farms exceeded 600,000 which made up 0.7 % of the
whole agricultural land. The countries with largest organic land were Australia (with 11.8
million hectares), Argentina (3.1 million hectares) , China (2.3 million hectares) and the US
(1.6 million hectares). In terms of regions, Oceania hosted 39 % of the total organic land,
Europe held 23 % and Latin America 19 %. The expansion of organic farmland is in part a
response to the increasing demand on the market. In 2005, sales of organic food and drink
reached 33 billion US Dollars globally with a 43 percent increase from 23 billion US-Dollars
since 2002.
Table 2.1: Organic Land and Farms by continent
Continent Organic land area(hectares) Share of total agricultural area Farms
Africa 890’504 0.11% 124’805
Asia 2’893’572 0.21% 129’927
Europe 6’920’462 1.38% 187’697
Latin America 5’809’320 0.93% 176’710
North America 2’199’225 0.56% 12’063
Oceania 11’845’100 2.59% 2’689
Total 30’558’183 0.74% 633’891
Source:FIBL Survey 2007
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Although organic farming takes place in almost every part of the world, the demand is
concentrated in a few regions. Particularly, consumer purchases in the European Union and
the US composed 95 percent of the global retail sales of organic food products in 2003.[Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2005]
Since these two regions constitute the largest markets worldwide and and provide satisfac-
tory data we will focus on them in the rest of this chapter and analyze the supply and demand
structures in both and achieve some insights for policy recommendations.
2.2 Supply Side: Organic production in Europe and in US
According to FIBL’s survey[Willer and Yussefi, 2007] 6.9 million hectares were managed
organically in Europe, 6.3 million hectares of this were in EU. The former makes up 1.4
percent and the latter 3.9 percent of all agricultural land. The number of organic farms in EU
was almost 160,000 and in Europe higher than 190,000.
In 2005, Italy had almost one-sixth of all organic land in Europe with about 1 mil-
lion hectares, followed by Spain (807,569 hectares) and Germany (807,406) hectares. The
smallest organic land was accounted by Bosnia Herzegovina (416 hectares). Austria had
the highest share of agricultural land managed organically, 14.7 percent of total hectares,
Switzerland’s organic land made up almost 11 percent of the total and Italy’s organic land
was 10.4 percent of the total. In Europe, average share of organic land was 1.38 percent and
in EU 3.18 percent.
Table 2.2: Organic land and farms in Europe
Country Year Organic Share of Organic farms
land area agricultural land
Albania 2006 1’170 0.10% 93
Austria 2005 360’972 14.16% 20’310
Belgium 2005 22’996 1.65% 693
Bosnia Herzegovina 2006 416 0.02% 26
Bulgaria 2005 14’320 0.27% 351
Croatia 2005 3’184 0.10% 269
Cyprus 2005 1’698 1.12% 305
Czech Rep 2005 254’982 5.97% 829
Denmark 2005 145’636 5.62% 2’892
Estonia 2005 59’862 7.22% 1’013
Finland 2005 147’587 6.52% 4’296
France 2005 560’838 2.03% 11’402
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Germany 2005 807’406 4.74% 17’020
Greece 2005 288’255 3.15% 14’614
Hungary 2005 123’569 2.90% 1’553
Iceland 2005 4’684 0.21% 23
Ireland 2005 35’266 0.84% 978
Italy 2005 1’067’102 8.40% 44’733
Latvia 2005 118’612 4.78% 2’873
Liechtenstein 2005 1’040 27.90% 35
Lithuania 2005 69’430 2.49% 1’811
Luxemburg 2005 3’243 2.51% 72
Macedonia 2005 249 0.02% -
Malta 2005 14 0.13% 6
Moldova 2005 11’075 0.44% 121
Netherlands 2005 48’765 2.49% 1’377
Norway 2005 43’033 4.14% 2’496
Poland 2005 167’740 1.03% 7’183
Portugal 2005 233’458 6.34% 1’577
Romania 2005 87’916 0.60% 2’920
Russian Federation 2005 40’000 0.02% 40
Serbia/Monte negro 2005 591 0.01% -
Slovak Republic 2005 92’191 4.91% 196
Slovenia 2005 23’499 4.84% 1’718
Spain 2005 807’569 3.20% 15’693
Sweden 2005 200’010 6.27% 2’951
Switzerland 2005 117’117 10.94% 6’420
Turkey 2005 93’133 0.24% 14’401
UK 2005 619’852 3.90% 4’285
Ukraine 2005 241’980 0.59% 72
Total Europe 6’920’462 1.38% 187’697
Total European Union 6’260’553 3.84% 160’380
Source:FIBL Survey 2007
Organic Livestock in EU
In 2003, total certified organic livestock amounted 3 million at EU-25 level, which made up
2.3% of the total livestock in European Union. 2.8 million of the total organic livestock was in
6
the former 15 member states, where Italy, Sweden and Germany had each more than 400000
units. The number of organic livestock was 0.33 million in UK, 0.31 million in France, 0.26
million in Austria and 0.22 million in Spain. Some member states had a significant share of
certified animals in specific livestock. For example, certified dairy cows were 16% of total
dairy cows in Austria, 10% of the dairy cows herd was certified in Denmark, %6 in Sweden
and %4 in United Kingdom.
The number of organic broiler and laying hens in EU-15 was more than 9 and 6 million
respectively in 2003. The share of organic hens in total hens was 1.7% on average in EU-15
but in Denmark, this was significantly high with 22%. 5.1 million broilers which is more than
half of total in EU-15, were in France and 1.4 million in UK.[EC, 2005]
Organic Land in US
Certified organic farmland in US has been increased enormously since 1990 when the Organic
Foods Production Act 1 was passed in Congress, however it’s share in total agricultural land
is still very small, especially compared to Europe and compared to the market size of US.
Since the demand is far beyond the supply, imports of organic food are quite high. In 2002,
US imports of organic food reached $1.0-1.5 billion and the ratio of imported to exported
organic products was 8 to 1.[Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2005]
According to USDA’s Economic Research Service [ERS, 2006], in 2005 total certified
organic farmland was about 1.65 million hectares (4 million acres) in United States. Al-
most 950,000 hectares (2.3 million acres) of this consisted of pasture land and about 700,000
hectares (1.7 million) of cropland. Total organic land made up 0.5 percent of more than 322
million hectares of agricultural land and the number of certified operations was 8,493. These
numbers are considerably small in comparison to Europe, however it should be added that
they still reflect substantial growth in the supply side. The change in total certified farmland
was 43 % between 1997 and 2002, and 111% between 2002 and 2005. The major factor that
contributed to the change in the latter period was the 272% increase in the organic pasture
land. In 2005, for the first time all 50 states had some organically managed land. California
was the leading state in certified organic cropland (about 90,000 hectares) and in the number
of farms (1,916). The number of organic animals, although being small relative to the market,
has been increased rapidly, reflecting the increasing demand especially to organic milk and
eggs. US-wide number of livestock and poultry totaled almost 14 millions in 2005, with an
almost 350% change from 3,2 millions in 2000. The number of organic milk cows jumped
from 38,196 in 2000 to 87,082 in 2005 and the number of organic layer hens from 1,113,746
1Organic Foods Production Act was first to establish national standards governing the marketing of certain
agricultural products as organic and was aiming at assuring consumers that organically produced products meet
a consistent standard.
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to 2,415,056 in the same period. There is still room for the market to grow since the demand
expands every year and these numbers of organic milk cows and layer hens made up only 1%
and .7% of the total respectively.
Table 2.3: Total organic acreage and animal herds, 2000-05
U.S. 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2000-05
certified in acres in acres in acres in acres in acres in acres % change
farmland
Total 1776073 2094272 1925534 2196874 3045109 4054429 128
Pasture/ 557167 789505 625902 745273 1592756 2331158 318
rangeland
Cropland 1218905 1304766 1299632 1451601 1452353 1723271 41
certified animals:
Livestock:
Beef cows 13829 15197 23384 27285 36662 36113 161
Milk cows 38196 48677 67207 74435 74840 87082 128
Other cows 0 993 10103 11501 36598 58822 0
Hogs and pigs 1724 3135 2753 6564 4883 10018 481
Sheep and lambs 2279 4207 4915 4561 4270 4471 96
Total livestock 56028 72209 108362 124346 157253 196506 251
Poultry:
Layer hens 1113746 1611662 1052272 1591181 1787901 2415056 117
Broilers 1924807 3286456 3032189 6301014 4769104 10405879 441
Turkeys 9138 98653 305605 217353 164292 144086 1477
Other 111359 17244 1880115 670604 583269 792249 611
Total
poultry 3159050 5014015 6270181 8780152 7304566 13757270 335
Total certified
operations* 6592 6949 7323 8035 8021 8493 29
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA
2.3 Organic Sales in US
United States experiences the expansion of organic products to almost every corner. Every
year more and more restaurants and university cafeterias add organic meals to their menu. In
contrast to the past, organic foods are not only sold in specialized shops or farmer markets, but
also in mainstream supermarket chains such as Wal-Mart and Target. According to Mintel,
top retail grocers in US now have more than 300 private organic Price Look-Ups (PLU),
which are numbers identifying the fresh products in grocery stores and supermarkets. This is
a very high number considering the fact that there are around 1300 universal PLU’s assigned.
According to Organic Trade Association (OTA)’s 2007 manufacturer survey, organic
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industry in US grew up 21 % in consumer sales in 2006, with respect to 2005, reaching $17.7
billion. Sales are estimated to reach $21.2 billion in 2007 and projected to be more than $23.6
billion in 2008. The largest segment within organic industry was the foods segment, which
made up 95% of all organic product sales with $16.7 billion and grew at an annual rate of
20.9% in 2006. The penetration rate of organic foods into the overall food industry was 2.8
percent in 2006, sustaining the uninterrupted increase from 0.8% in 1997.
US organic market is a demand driven market. As the demand grows rapidly, farmers
and firms, which produce, process and distribute organic food were sometimes unable to meet
the demand and faced some shortages in organic ingredients. In the same OTA survey, 52%
of the respondents revealed that they faced shortages in raw materials.
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Table 2.4: Total Foods and Organic Foods Consumer Sales and Penetration, 1997-2006
Organic Food Organic Food Total Food Organic
Sales($ million) Sales Growth Sales ($ million) Penetration
1997 $3,594 N/A $443,790 0.8%
1998 $4,286 19.2% $454,140 0.9%
1999 $5,039 17.6% $474,790 1.1%
2000 $6,100 21.0% $498,380 1.2%
2001 $7,360 20.7% $521,830 1.4%
2002 $8,625 17.3% $530,612 1.6%
2003 $10,381 20.2% $535,406 1.9%
2004 $11,902 14.6% $544,141 2.2%
2005 $13,831 16.2% $556,791 2.5%
2006 $16,718 20.9% $598,136 2.8%
Source: OTA’s Manufacturer Survey, 2006 and 2007
2.4 Organic Sales in Europe
Since there is no unified data collection system for organic market in Europe, information
and statistics about the organic market vary among different reports, due to the differences in
the degree of detail and the time period data collected and the country in focus.
According to FIBL’s Report[Willer and Yussefi, 2007], European organic market was
estimated to be worth of 14.2 billion Euros in 2005 with a growth rate of 10 to 15 percent in
value. This is a significant increase compared to the market value estimated by the same in-
stitution in 2004, i.e 12 billion Euros, with a growth rate of 5 to 7 percent. The highest growth
rates were recorded in Czech Republic (33 percent), UK (29 percent) and Spain (20 percent).
However Germany continues to be the largest market in Europe with an estimated sales value
of 3.9 billion Euros followed by Italy (2.4 billion Euros), Great Britain (2.33 billion Euros)
and France (2.2 billion Euros). Swiss market was estimated to be worth 763 million Euros
with a high 4.5 percent market share explaining the profile of Swiss consumer, who spent the
highest amount for organic products per capita with 103 Euros. Danish consumers spent 57
Euros per capita for organic products, followed by Austrian consumers (56 Euros per capita),
German consumers (47 Euros per capita), Italian consumers (42 Euros per capita) and British
consumers (39 Euros per capita).
In Germany, the infrastructure of organic providing shops is well developed, which has
been playing important role in the development of the market. These specialist shops include
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around 2500 independent heath food shops, 400 organic supermarkets, 2000 Reformhaeuser2,
500 organic bakeries and 100 organic butchers. 41 percent of organic foods were sold in tra-
ditional multiple retail chains, while 31 percent was sold in the specialist shops mentioned.
Specialized organic food market grew by 10 percent. The total number of organic food busi-
nesses including the producers, processors, importers and traders increased by 8.8 percent
in 2006 reaching 23,978. In contrast to Germany, 76 percent of all organic sales took place
in multiple retailers in UK, and 69 percent of all organic sales were reached in conventional
retail stores in Austria. Similar to UK, conventional retail chains amounted 75 percent of
all organic sales in Switzerland. Turkey has an infant organic market, mainly driven by the
international demand. Most of the production has been exported to more than 30 countries,
but mainly to Germany, Netherlands, Uk and Italy. In 2005, there were approximately 14,400
organic holdings in Turkey.
Table 2.5: The European market for organic food 2005:
Shares of the individual countries of the European organic
market
Germany
Turnover domestic organic food market 3’900’000’000
Population (million) 82.5
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 47
Italy
Turnover domestic organic food market 2’400’000’000
Population (million) 57.8
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 42
UK
Turnover domestic organic food market 2’333’000’000
Population (million) 59.5
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 39
France
Turnover domestic organic food market 2’200’000’000
Population (million) 59.9
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 37
Switzerland
Turnover domestic organic food market 763’000’000
Population (million) 7.4
2a special name for food shops which just sell food which is environment-friendly and does not include
preservatives
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Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 103
Netherlands
Turnover domestic organic food market 419’000’000
Population (million) 16.2
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 29
Austria
Turnover domestic organic food market 450’000’000
Population (million) 8.1
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 56
Sweden
Turnover domestic organic food market 433’000’000
Population (million) 9
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 48
Denmark
Turnover domestic organic food market 306’734’500
Population (million) 5.4
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 57
Spain
Turnover domestic organic food market 300’000’000
Population (million) 42.2
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 7
Finland
Turnover domestic organic food market 80’000’000
Population (million) 5.2
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 15
Ireland
Turnover domestic organic food market 66’000’000
Population (million) 4
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 17
Portugal
Turnover domestic organic food market 50’000’000
Population (million) 10.4
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 5
Norway
Turnover domestic organic food market 41’000’000
Population (million) 4.6
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Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 9
Poland
Turnover domestic organic food market 30’000’000
Population (million) 38.2
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 0.79
Czech Republic
Turnover domestic organic food market 12’000’000
Population (million) 10.2
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 1.2
Hungary
Turnover domestic organic food market 5’635’000 150
Population (million) 10.1
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 0.6
Ukraine
Turnover domestic organic food market 4’000’000
Population (million) 48.3
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 0.08
Liechtenstein
Turnover domestic organic food market 2’500’000
Population (million) 0.33
Per capita consumer expenditure for organic food 8
Source:The World of Organic Agriculture Statistics and Emerging Trends 2007
2.5 Fixed Cost Faced When Switching to Organic
Organic farming can be considered as a new technology. As economic theory suggests it
requires a fixed cost to be invested prior to enjoy the extra profit it brings. This fixed cost
is not as simple as we think of capital investment, which can be measured in terms of the
exact money we have to invest. Organic farming not only requires some investment in the
farms, as it may require new buildings, shelters, vehicles etc, but also new labor, preferably
experienced in organic farming techniques. On the other hand it has some risks related to
experiencing a new technique and adaptation period. Unsuccessful trials may end up in less
crop and considerable losses.
Organic standards require the livestock to be fed organically, hence as an example, a
corn producer would consider to make use of small grains and forage he has, by adding some
livestock to his farm in a conversion process. This requires the establishment of new pastures,
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building of fences and equipment to support the livestock.
Possible risks of converting to organic production include the delay of planting up to
one month due to new cultural practices which may reduce the chance of pollen drift. Since
crops need continuous scouting and hoeing, more labor is needed. Since pesticides are not
allowed, there is always a higher probability to have weeds in crops than using conventional
practices. In such a case, in order to begin harvest , a frost should be waited for, which means
delay in the whole process. If this cannot help, pitchfork should be used to clean out the
weed, which again requires additional labor.[Wolf, 2006]
Another major factor increasing the cost of organic production are longer crop rota-
tions used for pest and disease suppression. Overall net returns may be lower in organic
production systems since high-value crops are harvested less frequently than conventional
systems.[Temple, 2003]
State and private certifiers charge a fee for the certification which is an ongoing expense
in organic production. This may be not significant for large scale producers but certainly af-
fects small farmers. (It should be added that each producer making more than $5000/year
must be certified in US in order to claim organic) Before giving the organic certificate,
these agencies ask for the documentation of the 3-year conversion period in which land
must be managed according to the national organic standards. During this period, farmers
cannot obtain high prices for their organic products, hence must rely on conventional prices
with additional costs. This brings a need for financial self sufficiency for the conversion
years.[Oberholtzer et al., 2005]
2.6 Demand side: Organic consumers
The US demand for organic food is mostly triggered by concerns about food safety and the
integrity of the food consumed. As more food-borne illnesses appear in the media, con-
sumers become more sensitive about what they eat, and the belief that organic food is safer
than the conventional food makes them purchase more organic products. According to Food-
borne Diseases Active Surveillance Network(FoodNet)of CDC(Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention), in 2006 food supply was challenged by pathogens like Listeria (causes lethal
infection called listeriosis, which has a 25% case fatality rate) and Shigella (causes Shigel-
losis which develops fever and stomach cramps). Since infections caused by Salmonella and
E.coli are attributed to consumption of egg, poultry, meat and chicken, concern about food
safety reflects itself mostly in the demand of organic eggs, poultry and meat. For example
according to Mintel’s survey, many consumers believe that organic foods are the answer to
food-borne illnesses like BSE (mad cow disease).
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Who purchases organic? What is the reason not to buy?
According to Mintel’s survey in US, younger consumer’s demand is considerably higher than
olders. While 66% of the 18-24 age group consumed some organic food in previous year, this
was just %32 in the 65+ age group. In total, 52 percent of the respondents purchased some
organic food in the previous year. Income distribution of organic consumers is in line with
the common sense that organic food is a luxury good. According to the same survey, higher
income households are more likely to consume organic than lower income households. 56%
of households with higher than 100K/year income bought organic, where just 36% of the
ones with less than 25K/year could go for organic. The same pattern can be observed in
the frequency of organic purchases. 39% of the 25-34 age group and 30% of higher than
75K/year income households have answered “often” to the question “How frequent do you
buy organic?”, whereas just 11% of 65+ age group and 19 % of less than 25K/year income
group answered the same question as “often”.
Table 2.6: Frequency of purchase of organic food and drink, by age, July 2008
All 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
percent
Often 24 26 39 27 20 19 11
Occasionally 53 53 40 53 58 62 64
Rarely 21 21 22 20 23 20 25
Source: Mintel
Table 2.7: Frequency of purchase of organic food and drink, by household income, July 2008
All $25 K or less $25K-$49.9K $50K-$74.9K $75K-$99.9K $100K+
percent
Often 24 19 24 26 31 29
Occasionally 53 51 55 57 52 51
Rarely 21 30 21 17 17 20
Source: Mintel
The trend of more frequent organic purchases reveals the high potential of the market
to grow further. Based on the same survey, more than half of all age groups purchased
more organic in 2008 than the previous year. Especially 35-44 age group increased their
consumption, with 64%. The awareness of organic consumers shows itself as 70% of all
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organic consumers reported that they look for a guarantee of 100% organic. A considerable
47% not only looks for any guarantee but also a USDA seal.
Table 2.8: Purchase of organic food compared to previous year, based on age group, July
2008
All 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
percent
More 56 61 57 64 52 52 45
Less 6 9 5 4 4 4 9
The same 38 30 38 32 44 44 45
Source: Mintel
Table 2.9: Criteria for purchasing organic food, July 2007 and July 2008
2007 2008
percent
100% organic 70 69
No artificial ingredients 71 62
No preservatives 66 57
The USDA organic seal 46 47
Brands that give a percentage 13 16
of their profits to charity
None of the above - 8
Source: Mintel
In order to understand the demand structure, understanding the reasons of not buying
organic food is important. The answer to how much the demand would increase if prices
were lower lies in these reasons. Price remains as a very big issue. 93 % of all respondents of
Mintel survey in 2007 agreed that organic products are normally more expensive than non-
organic products. Although the high 60% of all respondents are willing to pay a premium
for organic products, 67% of them would buy more organic food if it were less expensive.
Almost half of the respondents, who did not buy organic in the previous year, said that if it
would be cheaper, they would go for organic. This shows that the possible demand increase
in case of a price reduction would be huge. Not only switching non-buyers would drag the
demand upward but also the increase in purchases of organic consumers. 84% of the organic
consumers said that they would buy more if organic products would be cheaper. It is not only
the budget constraint which drives the sensitivity to the price of organic, since a majority
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(74%) of the highest income non-buyers (the ones with more than $100K/yr) believe that the
price premium for organic products is not justified.
Overall consumer profile in the biggest organic markets in Europe is similar to that in
US. According to another Mintel survey, 88% of all Spanish respondents ,84% of all German
respondents,79% of al Italian respondents, 72% of all French respondents and 71% of all
British respondents purchased organic food in the previous year. More than half of organic
consumers in these countries believe that organic food is healthier for them. Additionally,
almost half of the German organic consumers, and almost one third of French, Spanish and
British consumers believe that organic food tastes better. As the income increases, positive
beliefs about organic become more widespread. In Germany, 49% of consumers with less
than an income of 15000 Euro/year agreed that organic is more healthier, whereas this is
60% among those with an income more than 30000 Euro/year. In France, 25-34 age group
and those with highest income are the most likely to purchase organic food, where in Italy,
typical organic shopper is 34-54 years old and has medium to high income and education.
Contrary to US, a small percentage of consumers in leading European organic markets
are willing to pay premium prices for organic food. Just 33% of British respondents agreed
that it is worth paying more for organic food, while just 22% of German respondents did so.
More than 40 % of Italian non-consumer respondents find organic food too expensive as a
reason for not buying it. 73% of British, 71% German and 68% of non-consumer French
respondents think the same way.
2.7 Price premiums in organic products
Price Premiums in EU
How much do prices of organic food differ in fact? The answer of this question gives us the
price premium. Although in general organic costs more than conventional food, the price
premium changes across countries and different product groups according EU -Report in
which price premiums of different product groups were calculated in 15 EU member states
in 2001[EC, 2005]. For farm gate prices, average of what farmers received when they sold
their product to wholesalers or processors was taken. For consumer prices data was collected
from shops chosen according to the important sales channels in each country.
Here are price premiums in farm gate and consumer prices for wheat, apples, potatoes,
milk and egg which constitute a significant basket of most frequently bought organic food.
For milk, eggs and potatoes price premiums for farmer prices are higher than for consumer
prices, whereas for wheat and apples the opposite is true.
Consumer price for conventional wheat flour were considerably different in each coun-
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try, for example 0.45e/kg in Sweden, 0.97e/kg in France and 0.80 e/kg in Germany. Con-
sumer price for the same quality of organic wheat was however 1.49e/kg on average. Price
premiums for wheat on average were 100% for both farm-gate and consumer prices.
Figure 2.1: Farm-gate and consumer prices for wheat flour in EU-15 (e/kg)
Farm gate prices for organic apples were lowest in Italy, (0.45e/kg), almost competing
with conventional apple prices, but this is not a surprise considering the fact that 60 % of
EU-15 organic apples sales originated in from Italy. Net imposters of organic apples on the
other hand, like UK and Denmark faced high prices, 1.42e/kg and 1.48e/kg respectively.
Except for Italy (2%), farm price premiums were higher than 50% for all member states,
where consumer price premiums ranged from 37 % in Sweden to 283%in Portugal.
For organic potatoes, farm price premium was on average 166%, with relatively low
level (71%) in Sweden and considerably high levels (293% and 285% respectively) in Italy
and Austria. Highest prices for organic potatoes at farm-gate were charged in Ireland (0.70e/kg)
and in Greece (0.64e/kg) where in Denmark (0.24e/kg), Germany (0.25e/kg) and Belgium
(0.26e/kg) they were relatively cheap. Average consumer price premiums was relatively less
than farm price premiums and ranged from 30% in Ireland to 170 % in Greece.
Farm gate price premiums for organic milk were relatively low with respect to other
products, with an average of about 18%. On the other hand, consumer price premium was on
average 50 %, with highest levels in Greece (129%), Portugal (124%) and in Italy (117%).
Highest prices for organic milk were observed in these countries, 2.20e/l in Greece, 1.57e/l
in Portugal and 1.12e/l in Italy.
Organic eggs costed highest in Greece both at farm level and as consumer price (0.30e/egg
and 1.79e/egg respectively). Corresponding price premiums were huge: 329% and 231%.
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Figure 2.2: Farm-gate and consumer prices for apples in EU-15 (e/kg)
Lowest price for organic eggs was charged in Netherlands at farm level (0.11e/egg) and as
consumer price (0.25e/egg). Average price premium was 132 % at farm gate level.
Price Premiums in US
Monthly organic prices at wholesale level for a few products such as broccoli, carrots, eggs
and poultry are released by Economic Research Service of USDA. According to the available
data, price premiums stay high even though there is rapid market expansion in all of the
products each year. This suggests that demand is still larger than supply and that there is still
room for new producers to enter the market.[Lydia Oberholtzer and Lopez, 2006]
As can be seen in the graph below, price for organic whole broilers stayed at a steady
$2.17/pound from March 2004 to February 2006 and at $2.21/pound from April 2006 on-
wards whereas the price for conventional broiler ranged from a low $0.59/pound in April
2006 to the high $0.82/pound in June 2005. There is continuous fluctuation in conventional
prices but no significant downward or upward pattern. Due to this fluctuation, average quar-
terly price premiums ranged from 169 percent in the second quarter of 2004 to 262 percent in
the second quarter of 2006. The average price premium in the whole period was 200 percent.
A similar pattern for organic eggs can be observed between 2004 and 2006. Starting
from July 2004 first receiver prices for organic large eggs remained at a monthly average of
$2.34/dozen. However conventional egg prices varied in a larger but lower range than for
poultry, resulting in more variable and much higher price premiums. Except for March 2004
(when the price was $1.14 per dozen), conventional egg prices were below $1 per dozen,
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Figure 2.3: Farm-gate and consumer prices for potatoes in EU-15 (e/kg)
leading to an average of 273 percent premium.
Although are not representative for the whole range of vegetables, sustained price pre-
miums for organic carrot and broccoli can give some insight about the evolution of the market.
In the last quarter of 1999, price premium for wholesale organic broccoli was 126%, whereas
it was 105% in the third quarter of 2004. However the erratic pattern of the premium (in
which it saw a bottom 65% in the last quarter of 2001 and a top of 223% in the last quarter
of 2003) suggests that organic sellers can still sustain high premiums due to the high de-
mand and willingness to pay of organic consumers. Contrary to broccoli, wholesale prices
for organic and conventional carrots did not fluctuate between the third quarter of 2001 and
2004, sustaining a premium above 130% for the whole period.[Oberholtzer et al., 2005] This
is probably due to the formal and informal contracts between retailers and producers.
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Figure 2.4: Farm-gate and consumer prices for milk in EU-15 (e/kg)
Figure 2.5: Farm-gate and consumer prices for eggs in EU-15 (e/kg)
21
Figure 2.6: Prices and quarterly price premiums for organic whole broilers
Source:ERS/USDA
Figure 2.7: Prices and quarterly price premiums for organic large eggs Source:ERS/USDA
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Figure 2.8: Quarterly price premiums for wholesale organic broccoli Source:ERS/USDA
Figure 2.9: Quarterly price premiums for wholesale organic carrots Source:ERS/USDA
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Chapter 3
Prospective ban of conventional egg
production in Europe
An example for banning the old technology to spread the new technology and achieve welfare
improvements happened in Europe in the last ten years. With the directive 1999/74/EC,
European Council set down standards for egg production including the prohibition of the
use of conventional cage systems as of 1 January 2012. Since there are several systems
used as an alternative to cage system, this does not mean that all egg producers switch to
organic immediately, but we can assume that there will be increases in conversion to the
organic system since it enables the producers to capture attractive price premiums and the
necessary fixed cost should be invested in any new system because of the new legislation.
In this chapter we will explain the different egg production systems with a particular focus
on the conventional and most widely used battery cage system and as an alternative, organic
system. Then we will examine the cost differences between these two systems and finally
will mention some works forecasting overall welfare increase as a result of the ban.
As egg is an indispensable component of daily diet we can assume that everyone con-
sumes it periodically. Just in EU-25, 6’349 million tons of eggs were produced for human
consumption in 2003 and yearly consumption per head was about 14.2 kg.[Timmis, 2004]There
are several different systems used in production of eggs. These are the cage system, the barn
system, free range system and organic system. Cage system is the most widely used sys-
tem throughout Europe (89% of the total production) but also the most controversial one.
The cages used to host the hens in this system are also called battery cages since they are
arranged in batteries of rows and tiers. They allow 550 cm2 cage area per hen and hens gen-
erally have no access to direct sunlight or outdoor. In the barn system there are perches and
feeders in the hen house. According to directive 1999/74/EC, there should be “either linear
feeders providing at least 10 cm per bird or circular feeders providing at least 4 cm per bird
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and at least one nest for every seven hens. If group nests are used, there must be at least 1
m2 of nest space for a maximum of 120 hens” In the free range system, hens have contin-
uous access to runs with vegetation with a maximum density of 2,500 birds per hectare, in
addition to the housing regulations of the barn system. In organic system, additional to con-
tinuous outdoor access, hens have to be fed with organic feed.Until 2003, Spain, Portugal,
Italy and Greece had very low proportions of their national flocks kept in alternative systems
(just about 1-2 %). On the other hand, some member states had large proportional use of
alternative systems such as Austria (28%), Denmark (34.5% of which 14.1% was organic),
Sweden (52% with 6% in organic systems) and UK (31%). In France and Germany, the use
of alternative systems was at 12-13%, where it was 4-5 % in Belgium and Finland.
The bad conditions hens face in the cage system raised a lot of opposition from dif-
ferent parts of society, including non-governmental organizations and political parties. As a
result, European Council took action against the poor welfare conditions of animals with it’s
Directive/1999/74/EC which laid down minimum standards for the protection of laying hens.
According to this, as of 1 January 2003, battery cages have not been allowed to be built for the
first time and they will be totally abandoned as of 1 January 2012. However, the so called ‘en-
riched cages’ which provides 750 cm2 cage area per hen and somewhat better conditions, are
allowed from then on. Only Sweden has been quick to respond to the new legislation so that
in 2005, the transition to alternative systems was almost complete.[Taylor, 2005])Besides,
Switzerland has banned caged systems in 1981 with a ten year transition period and now all
eggs are produced through alternative systems in this country, where 60% of which is free
range and the rest is barn system.
Based on data from EU-15 in 2000, egg production was generally large scale and in-
creasingly concentrated. 65% of laying hen places had flocks with more than 30,000 birds
and compared to 1995, the number of holdings decreased where the number of their laying
hen places increased. Average flock size has increased by 31 % between 1995 and 2000,
where this increase was 148% in Portugal, 123% in Denmark and 111% in Finland. These
increases along with the 10% increase in the average number of laying hens per unit for places
with more than 30,000 hens show the increasing concentration in the sector.[Timmis, 2004]
Based on the results of a survey of egg producing enterprises in England, production
costs of cage and organic systems, calculated by Russell et.al[Russell et al., 2005] are sum-
marized in the table below.
Here, gross margin is defined as enterprize gross output minus variable cost. The value
of produced eggs including the ones sold and consumed in the farm give the gross output,
where variable cost includes feed cost, cost of disposal of old hens, veterinary charges, con-
tract charges, casual labor cost and miscellaneous cost. Net margin before marketing cost is
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Table 3.1: Comparison between two production systems
Cage Organic
Number of units in the sample 56 15
Average number of birds 76,944 9,370
Egg yield per bird 279 277
Mortality percentage 6.0 10.8
Average feed price (£/ton) 111 227
Production labor cost per 1000 birds (£) 958 3261
(paid and unpaid labor)
Price of own produced eggs sold (p/doz) 44.8 112.7
Feed cost of egg produced (pence/dozen) 19.8 47.9
Total production cost a (pence/dozen) 37.74 88.86
Gross and Net Margins:(pence/dozen)
Gross revenue 45.18 113.49
Bird depreciation 8.00 10.57
Variable production costs 20.77 49.75
Gross margin 16.42 53.17
Fixed production costs 8.97 28.45
Net margin (before marketing costs) 7.45 24.72
Marketing costs 2.47 4.69
Net margin (after marketing costs) 4.98 20.03
Farmer and spouse labor cost:(p/doz)
included in the fixed cost 0.43 4.50
included in marketing cost 0.30 0.43
Gross margin (£/bird) 3.82 12.27
Net margin (after marketing costs) (£/bird) 1.16 4.62
Source: The Economics of Egg Production:2003
defined as “enterprize gross output minus all variable and fixed production costs”. The fixed
production cost includes “depreciation of buildings and equipment used in production-related
activities, paid and unpaid labor for production activities, land rent, electricity, water, insur-
ance, office expenses and other miscellaneous costs.” Total cost of egg production consists of
all variable costs plus fixed costs. Marketing cost includes packing materials, paid and unpaid
labor used for marketing activities, advertising and promotion costs. Net margin measures
“what is left to reward resources used in management and those used for investment in the
enterprize after all other factors of production have been paid an appropriate return” As can
be observed in the results, although the cost of organic system is fairly high with respect to
the traditional cage system, it cannot explain the difference in gross margins between two
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systems. This means that higher costs of organic system is not the only reason for the or-
ganic price premiums but also consumers’ higher willingness to pay. This suggests that if the
competition in the organic egg sector increases, we can expect a price decrease.
According to a report to European Commision to analyze the effects of the Directive/1999/74/EC[Timmis, 2004],
at EU 15-level, variable costs made up 73% and fixed costs 27% of total costs in the tradi-
tional cage system, whereas variable cost’s share in the total cost was 68% in the organic
system. Total costs per kg eggs in 15 member states can be seen in the figures below.
Figure 3.1: Total costs in the traditional cage system per kg eggs
As the production costs in UK suggested, the difference in variable costs between tra-
ditional cage system and the organic system is not high enough to explain the high price
premiums for organic eggs, suggesting that price cuts in the market are possible in the future
with the increased competition in the organic sector.
The analysis of the reaction of the market to some shocks, utilizing a popular method in
agricultural economics, i.e. Equilibrium Displacement Modeling, proposes that “as a result of
an increase in demand for alternatively produced eggs both producers and consumers show a
gain in surplus, the latter partly as a result of an increase in utility from increased consumption
of alternatively produced eggs (with more desirable characteristics).This amounts to some 77
million for producers ande19 million for consumers in the case of a 20% increase in demand
in the EU-15 (and respectively e65 million for producers and e15 million for consumers for
27
Figure 3.2: Total costs in the organic system per kg eggs
the EU-25).”[Timmis, 2004]
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Chapter 4
The Model
4.1 Consumers
There is a large number of consumers with identical tastes but different income levels in our
model. Let the income of consumer i is denoted by θi. We assume that θi is distributed uni-
formly between t and 1 where (0<t<1). Consumers spend their income on a given product
and a numeraire good and derive utility from both. Assuming that the quantity of the nu-
meraire good is denoted by Y , the quantity of the product by X , and the price of the product
by pX , consumers’ budget constraint can be described as
pX ·X + Y = θi
There are two quality levels of the product, high and low, denoted by sH and sL. Suppose
that high quality product is sold for pH and low quality product is sold for pL. The product
is indivisible and if consumers buy the product, they buy either high or low quality. Hence,
X = 1 in the budget constraint. Moreover,
U i(sH , p, θ
i) > U i(sL, p, θ
i), for all θi, p
This means that at each income level, high quality product is preferred to low quality product
given that they have the same price. As used in [Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979] such prefer-
ences can be described by a utility function as given below
U i(sH , pH , θ
i) = (1 + sH)(θ
i − pH) (4.1)
U i(sL, pL, θ
i) = (1 + sL)(θ
i − pL) (4.2)
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where sH > sL. If nothing is bought, utility is simply θi.
Given the utility functions and prices, we can determine the relative size of the con-
sumers buying each product. In order to derive the demand for each quality level we need to
find the income θ∗ of the consumer who is indifferent between the two quality level. Then,
for this consumer the following must hold.
U(sH , pH , θ
∗) = U(sL, pL, θ∗)
By using 4.1 and 4.2 it is easy to verify that
θ∗ =
pH(1 + s1)− pL(1 + sL)
sH − sL
Since income is assumed to be uniformly distributed between t and 1, the number of
consumers purchasing the high and low quality products (note that this is equal to the number
of products sold) are given by
QH =
∫ 1
θ∗
1
1− tdx
QL =
∫ θ∗
t
1
1− tdx, if U
i(sL, pL, t) > t
In the following we assume that t is sufficiently large so that U i(sL,pL,t)>t is satisfied
and hence the market is covered. Substituting θ∗ in QH and QL, we get the demand function
for each quality level of the product.
QH =
sH − sL − pH(1 + sH) + pL(1 + sL)
(1− t)(sH − sL)
QL =
pH(1 + sH)− pL(1 + sL)− t(sH − sL)
(1− t)(sH − sL)
Inverse demand for high quality product, which we will use later is derived from above as
pH =
sH − sL + pL(1 + sL)− (1− t)(sH − sL)QH
1 + sH
(4.3)
4.2 Firms
We assume that the low quality product is based on a well established technology and there
are many firms which can produce it at a per unit cost of cL. We assume that this segment
is competitive, hence the price is given by the marginal cost cL. Unit cost of producing high
quality product is cH and high quality product requires a new technology, hence a fixed in-
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vestment cost of F. Therefore the number of firms which would produce it is endogenous. For
simplicity we will concentrate on the case where without intervention high quality product is
produced by a single firm.
We assume that firms compete by selecting their quantity as strategic variable.
Proposition 4.2.1. If
F ≤ F ≤ F
where
F =
(sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− cH(1 + sH))2
9(1 + sH)(sH − sL)(1− t)
F =
(sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− cH(1 + sH))2
4(1 + sH)(sH − sL)(1− t)
then the high quality product is produced by a single firm. In this case;
(i) equilibrium price is
p̂m =
sH − sL + cH(1 + sH) + cL(1 + sL)
2(1 + sH)
(ii) the quantity of the high quality product sold in equilibrium is
q̂m =
sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− cH(1 + sH)
2(sH − sL)(1− t)
(iii) equilibrium profit of the firm is
pim =
(sH − sL + cl(1 + sL)− cH(1 + sL))2
4(1 + sH)(sH − sL)(1− t) − F
Proof. If without intervention high quality product is produced by a single firm, producing
high quality product should not be profitable when there are two firms. In this case, let the
profit of firm i, producing the high quality product be denoted by pii. Then,
pii = (pH − cH)qi − F, for i = 1, 2
where pH is the inverse demand derived by equation 4.3 as
pH =
sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− (1− t)(sH − sL)(q1 + q2)
1 + sH
Note that the profit functions are concave. This means that first order conditions describe a
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pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game where profits are maximized for both
firms.
First order condition (FOC) for firm i=1,2 is given by
sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− (1− t)(sH − sL)qL − 2(1− t)(sH − sL)qi
1 + sH
− cH = 0
Solving FOCs we get the quantity produced by each firm in equilibrium, which is;
q̂ =
sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− cH(1 + sH)
3(sH − sL)(1− t)
and the equilibrium price would be
p̂ =
sH − sL + cH(2sH + 2) + cL(sL + 1)
3(1 + sH)
With these equilibrium price and quantities, the profit of each firm is negative if
F >
(sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− cH(1 + sH))2
9(1 + sH)(sH − sL)(1− t)
and producing high quality is not profitable for both. This gives us the lower bound for F as
defined in proposition 4.2.1.
We should also check that the profit is positive when there is only one firm producing
high quality product. In this case, the profit of the monopoly is given by
pim = (pm − cH)qm − F
where the inverse demand is given by
pm =
sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− (1− t)(sH − sL)qm
1 + sH
As the profit function is concave, first order condition describes a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium of the game as before.
FOC for the monopoly is given by
sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− cH − 2(1− t)(sH − sL)qm = 0
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where equilibrium quantity is:
q̂m =
sH − sL + cL(1 + sL)− cH(1 + sH)
2(sH − sL)(1− t)
and equilibrium price is:
p̂m =
sH − sL + cH(1 + sH) + cL(1 + cL)
2(1 + sH)
At equilibrium, the profit of the firm is positive if
F <
(s1 − s2 + c2(1 + s2)− c1(1 + s1))2
4(1 + s1)(sH − sL)(1− t)
This gives us the upper bound of F as defined in proposition 4.2.1.
4.3 Is banning the low quality product a viable policy op-
tion?
Sometimes social policy makers take actions which may seem restrictive but in the long run
increase social welfare. We will consider the case where low quality product is banned by
the local authority. This may be done directly through a law issued by the government as Eu-
ropean Union is planning to ban conventional battery cages for egg laying hens as of January
2012 to promote new “enriched cages” which will provide hens more space and include a
nest, litter, perch and clawing boards. Such a ban can also be thought of increasing the price
of the low quality product to a prohibitively high level. In this case high quality product com-
petes with an alternative that has a very high price and can not survive in the market. We will
look at the consequences of such a ban in the market and investigate its effects on the welfare
of the actors i.e. consumers and producers. If such a ban is implemented, the consumer with
the lowest income θ∗b , who buys the high quality product will have to be indifferent between
buying the high quality product and nothing at all. Our intuition suggests that his income
should be less than the income θ∗ of the consumer who was indifferent between low and
high quality product in the previous case. This means that there must be some consumers
who were buying the low quality product before, but decide to buy high quality product now.
However, at the same time there may be some consumers who were buying the low quality
product but will opt for buying nothing at all as a consequence of the ban. If θ∗b is sufficiently
low, i.e. if the number of consumers buying high quality product increases sufficiently, there
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may be a potential for new firms enter the market and pull the equilibrium price down which
in a chain effect leads to a further increase of the demand.
Proposition 4.3.1. If low quality product is banned and F<F˜ holds, where
F˜ =
(cH(1 + sH)− sH)2
9sH(1 + sH)(1− t)
then at least two firms produce high quality product contrary to the previous case.
Proof. Let the income of the consumer who is indifferent between buying and not buying the
high quality product be denoted by θ∗b . For this consumer, U (sH ,pb,θ)=U (0,0,θ) holds. θ
∗
b is
easily derived as:
θ∗b =
pb(1 + sH)
sH
The number of consumers buying the high quality product is given by:
Qb =
sH − pb − sHpb
sH(1− t)
and inverse demand function derived from above is
pb =
(1−Qb(1− t))sH
1 + sH
If there are two firms producing high quality product, their profit is
piib = (pb − cH)qib − F, for i = 1, 2
where
pb =
(1− (q1b + q2b)(1− t))sH
1 + sH
FOC for firm i = 1, 2 is given by:
∂piib
∂qib
=
(1− 2qib(1− t)− qib(1− t))sH
1 + sH
− cH = 0
In equilibrium, quantity produced by each firm is:
q˜b =
1
3(1− t) −
cH(1 + sH)
3(1− t)sH
Equilibrium price is:
p˜b =
2cH
3
+
sH
3(1 + sH)
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In equilibrium, profit of each firm is:
piib =
(cH(1 + sH)− sH)2
9sH(1 + sH)(1− t) − F
which is positive if F < F˜ given in proposition 4.3.1.
Welfare improvement
If the low quality is banned and if the assumptions of proposition 4.3.1 hold, then two firms
produce high quality product and consumers either buy the high quality product or nothing
at all. To make welfare analysis we have to consider the well-being of everyone in society,
i.e. consumers’ as well as producers’ well-being before and after the ban. Although it looks
like simply adding consumer and producer surpluses in each case and comparing them, this
way of computing the welfare is problematic. We should note here that the utility function
describing consumer preferences was not quasilinear, hence there exist wealth effects of any
price change which need to be taken into account in welfare analysis. Therefore we will
construct a money metric indirect utility function because it will allow us to measure the
welfare change in dollars. We will use a well-known measure of welfare change, equivalent
variation (EV) for consumers and add it to the change in total profits to make an overall
welfare comparison. EV can be thought of as the change in consumer’s wealth which is
equivalent to the welfare effect of the change in consumption good and its price. In our
model, it is given by:
EV (p0, p1, θ) = e(p0, u1)− e(p0, u0)
where po corresponds to the price level before the ban, p1 to the price level after the ban,
expenditure function is denoted by e(.). Finally, u0 and u1 denote utilities gained before and
after the ban.
Since the ban affects members of society differently we have to consider its effects
separately. For any consumer, who was buying high quality product before the ban, EV is
defined as:
(1 + sH)(θ − p˜b) = (1 + sH)(θ + EV − p̂m)
Hence, for those consumers EV is simply p̂m− p˜b. It must be added that some consumers
change their choice before ban, if they are compensated with EV. To find out these consumers
we need to compute the income θcr of the critical consumer, who is the last of those at the
income scale. θcr can be thought of as the income of the consumer buying high quality
product after the ban who has the same utility with the consumer who was indifferent between
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high and low quality before the ban. Hence;
(1 + sH)(θ
∗ − p̂m) = (1 + sH)(θcr − p˜b)
For those who were buying the low quality product before the ban but switch to the high
quality product after the ban, EV is defined as:
(1 + sH)(θ − p˜b) = (1 + sL)(θ + EV − cL)
Finally, for those who were consuming low quality good before the ban but decide not to buy
anything afterwards, EV is given by:
θ = (1 + sL)(θ + EV − cL)
Total equivalent variation for consumers is then:
EV =
∫ θ∗b
t
EV (θ) dθ +
∫ θcr
θ∗b
EV (θ) dθ +
∫ 1
θcr
EV (θ) dθ
1− t
Because of the cumbersomeness of resulting equations, we do not present them here but they
are easy to derive.
Through numeric substitution of the parameters satisfying binding conditions, we find
that positive total welfare change for consumers is possible although those at the bottom of the
income scale become worse off. However, if t is not extremely low, i.e. if the lowest income
in society is not extremely low, the negative welfare change is slight and can be restored
very easily through transfers. As a result, consumers achieve higher utility levels while high
technology is more widely used. Hence for a social policy maker primarily focusing on
consumers’ well-being, banning old technology can be a viable and desirable policy option.
In the case where we add total EV for consumers to the difference in firms’ profits,
we were not able to find numeric values for parameters which result in positive total welfare
change because of the additional fixed cost the entering firm has to spend while switching to
high technology. However as we mentioned before, for a social policy maker valuing con-
sumers’ well being primarily, banning is still a desirable policy since it results in widespread
use of high-tech products increasing consumers’ overall well being.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a model in which a large number of consumers with identical
tastes are identified with their income levels and split their income to buy a specific product
and a numeraire good. There are two quality levels of the product, high and low, and high
quality product is preferred to low quality product by all consumers. According to their
budget, consumers decide on consuming the high quality product, the low quality product, or
nothing at all. The production of high quality product necessitates the use of high technology,
while low quality product is based on old technology. Use of high technology requires initial
investment, hence it bears a fixed cost. Due to this fixed cost, there is only one firm which
produces it, where low quality good is produced in a competitive market. We analyze the
effects of a ban on low quality product in the market. We find that as a result of the ban, the
number of firms using high technology increases which leads to a decrease of the high quality
product’s price and the number of consumers enjoying high quality increases.
Since a recent example of banning old technology is the ban of conventional egg pro-
duction system, the so called “battery cage system” throughout Europe, we focus on this
market and explain different technologies used in the production of eggs. We also look at the
cost structures of firms and mention some works forecasting welfare improvements with the
complete application of the ban.
Moreover, we focus on the organic food market in United States and Europe, investigate
its evolution and try to understand the structure of this market. By doing this first we look at
the supply side and see how far the production and sales grew in the last decade. We explain
the fixed costs needed to be invested in during the conversion period. Then we look at the
demand side and observe that the demand is far beyond supply especially in US, and price
premiums resulting from high consumer willingness to pay remain high. We observe that
younger and richer consumers are more inclined to consume organic, as in our model setup.
As our analysis shows, organic food market is consistent with our model and we propose that
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banning conventional methods can lead to welfare improvements and should be considered
as a policy option. Broadening our perspective, we conclude that in any appropriate market
banning old technology should be considered as a possible market intervention to increase
total welfare of the society.
38
Bibliography
[Dimitri and Oberholtzer, 2005] Dimitri, C. and Oberholtzer, L. (2005). Market-led versus
government-facilitated growth, development of the u.s. and eu organic agricultural sectors.
Technical Report WRS-05-05, Economic Research Service United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA).
[EC, 2005] EC (2005). Organic farming in the european union facts and figures. Report,
European Commission.
[ERS, 2006] ERS (2006). Technical report.
[Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979] Gabszewicz, J. J. and Thisse, J. F. (1979). Price competition,
quality and income disparities. Journal of Economic Theory, 20(3):340 – 359.
[Lydia Oberholtzer and Lopez, 2006] Lydia Oberholtzer, C. G. and Lopez, E. (2006). Or-
ganic poultry and eggs capture high price premiums and growing share of specialty mar-
kets. Technical Report LDP-M-150-01, Economic Research Service/United States De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA).
[Oberholtzer et al., 2005] Oberholtzer, L., Dimitri, C., and Greene, C. (2005). Price pre-
miums hold on as u.s. organic produce market expands. Technical Report VGS-308-01,
Economic Research Service United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
[Russell et al., 2005] Russell, N., Zhuang, Y., Farrar, J., and Clare, M. (2005). The eco-
nomics of egg production: 2003. Report.
[Taylor, 2005] Taylor, J. (2005). Situation and outlook report for sweden. Report 73, Eu-
roEgg and Business AB.
[Temple, 2003] Temple, S. (2003). The transition from conventional to low- input or or-
ganic farming systems: Soil biology, soil chemistry, soil physics, energy utilization, eco-
nomics and risk. Technical Report SW99-008, Sustainable Agriculture Research and Ed-
ucation(SARE).
39
[Timmis, 2004] Timmis, K. (2004). Study on the socio-economic implications of the various
systems to keep laying hens. Report, AGRA CEAS Consulting.
[Willer and Yussefi, 2007] Willer, H. and Yussefi, M. (2007). The world of organic agri-
culture statistics and emerging trends 2007. Technical report, International Federation of
Agricultural Movements (IFOAM) and Research Institute of Organic Agriculture(FIBL).
[Wolf, 2006] Wolf, T. (2006). Assessing producer options and obstacles for organic agricul-
ture. Crop Management.
40
